Analogous findings were accumulating in the mathematics education literature. In the early 19805, Silver (1982) , Silver, Branca, and Adams (1980) , and Garofulo and Lester-(1985) pointed out the usefulness of the constrUa for mathematics educators; Lesh (1983 Lesh ( , 1985 focused on the instability of stUdentS' conceptualizations of problems and problem sitUations and of the consequences of such difficulties. Speaking loosely, all of these StUdies dealt with the same set of issues regarding effeaive and resourceful problem-solving behavior. Their resultS can be summed up as follows: It's not just what you know; it's hmv, when, and whether you use it. The focus here is on tWOsetS of stUdies designed to he1p stUdents deve10p self-regulatory skUls during mathematical problem solving. The stUdies were chosen for discussion because of (1) the e."q)lidt focus on self-regulation in both stUdies, (2) the amount of time each devoted to helping stUdents develop such skills, and (3) the detailed reflections on success and failure in each. Schoenfeld's (1985a Schoenfeld's ( . 1987a problem-solving courses at the college level have as one of their major goa1s the development of executive or contral skills. Here is a brief summary, adapted from Schoenfe1d (1989d) The major issues are illUStrated in Figures 15.3 and 15.4 . Figure 15 .3 shows the graph of a problem-solving attempt by a pair of students working as a team. The StUdents read the problem, quickly chose an approach to it, and pursued that FIGURE15-1 Time-line graph of a typical student attempting to solve einon-standard problem.
approach. They kept working on it, despite clear evidence that they were not making progress, for the full 20 minutes allocated for the problem session. Ar.the end of the 20 minutes, they were asked how that approach would have helped them to solve the original problem. They couldn't say. The reader may not have seen this kind of behavior too often. Such behavior does not generally appear when stUdems work routine exercises, since the problem comext in that case tells the stUdems which techniques to use. (In a unit test on quadratic equations, for example, stUdems know that they'll be using the quadratic formula.) But when stUdents are doing real problem solving, working on unfamiliar problems out of comext, such behavior more reflects the norm than not. In Schoenfeld's collection of (more than a hundred) videorapes of college and high-school students working unfamiliar problems, roughly 60% of the solution attempts are of the "read, make a decision quickly, and pursue that direction come hell or high water" variery. And that first, quick, wrong decision, jf not reconsidered and reversed, guarantees failure. Figure 15 .4, which stands in stark contrast to Figure 15 .3, traces a mathematics faculty member's attempt to solve a difficult tWo-part problem. The first thing to note is that the mathematician spent more than half of his allotted time trying to make sense of the problem. Rather than committing himself to any one particular direction, he did a significant amoum of analyzing and (struCtUred) exploring-not spending time in 
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unstruCtUred exploration or moving imo implememation until he was sure he was working in the right direction. Second, note that each of the small inverted triangles in Figure 15 .4 represems an explicit commem on the state of his problem solution, for example, "Hmm. I don't know exactly where to start heren (followed by tWo minutes of analyzing the problem) or "OK. All I need to be able to do is [a particular technique] and I'm done" (followed by the straightforward implememation of his problem solution). It is imeresting that when this faculty member began working the problem, he had fewer of the facts and procedures required to solve the problem readily accessible to him man did most of the stUdentS who were recorded working the problem. And, as he worked through the problem, the mathematician generated enough potential wild goose chases to keep an army of problem solvers bUS}:But he didn't get deflected by them. By monitoring his solution with care-pursuing interesting leads and abandoning paths that didn't seem to bear fruit-he managed to solve the problem, while the vast majority of stUdents did not
The general claim is that these tWo illustrations are relatively typical of adult student and "expen" behavior on unfamiliar problems. For the most part, students are unaware of or fail to use the executive skills demonstrated by the expert However, it is the case that suchskills can be learned as aresult of explicit instruction that focuses on metacognitive aspects of mathematical thinking. That instruction takes the form of "coaching," with active interventions as students work on problems.
Roughly one third of the time in Schoenfeld's problemsolving classes is spent with the students working problems in small groups. The dass divides imo groups of three or four stUdents and works on problems that have been distributed, while the instructor circulates through the room as "roving consultant" As he moves through the room, he reserves the right to ask the following three questions at any time:
What (exactly) are you doing? (Can you describe it precisely?) Why are you doing it? (How does it fit into the solution?) How does it help you? (What will you do with the outcome when you obtain it?)
He begins asking these questions early in the term. When he does so, the stUdents are generally at a loss regarding how to answer them. With the recognition that, despite their uncomforrableness, he is going to continue asking those questions, the stUdents begin to defend themselves against them by discussing the answers to them in advance. By the end of the term, this behavior has become habitUal. (Note, however, that the better part of a semester is necessary to obtain such changes.)
The results of these interventions are best iIlustrated in Figure 15 .5,which sunimariZes a pair of stUdents' problem-solving attempt after taking the course. After reading the problem, they jumped imo one solution attempt which, unfortUnately, was based on an unfounded assumption. They realized this a few minutes later and decided to tty something else. That choice too was a bad one, and they got involved in compIicared computations that kept them occupied for 8! minutes. But at that point they stopped once again. One of the students said, "No, we aren't getting anything here [What we're doing isn't justi- The StUdents' solution is hardly expen-like in the standard sense, since they found the "right" approach quite late in the problem session. Yet in many ways their work resembled the mathematician's behavior illustrated in Figure 15 .4 far more than the typica1 student behavior illustrated in Figure 15 .3. The point here is not that the studentS managed to solve the problem, for to a significant degree solving nonstandard problems is a matter of luck and prior knowledge. The point is, that by virtue of good self-regulation, the studentS gave themselves the opportunity to solve the problem. They cunailed one possible wild goose chase shortly after beginning tO work on the problem and truncated extensive computations halfway through the solution. Had they failed to do 50 (and they and the majority of their peers did fail to do 50 prior to the course), they never would have had the opportunity to pursue the correct solution they did tind In this, the studentS' behavior was e..'q)en-like. And in this,their solution was also typical of post-instruction attemptS by the studentS. In contrast to the 60% of the "jump into a solution attempt and pursue it no matter what" attemptS prior to the course, fewer than 20% of the post-irisiruction' solution attemptS were of that type. There was a concomitant crease in problem-solving success. Lester et al. (1989, June) recently completed a major research and intervention study at the middle school-level, "designed to study the role of metacognition (that is, the lmowledge and control of cognition) in seventh graders' mathematica1 problem solving" (p. v). The goal of the instruction, which took place in one "regular" and one "advanced" seventh-grade mathematics dass, was to foster studentS' metacognitive development. Ways of achieving this goal were to have the teacher (1) serve as externaI monitor during problem solving, (2) encourage discussion of behaviors considered important for the intemalization of metacognitive skills, and (3) model good executive behavior. Table  15 .2 delineates the teacher behaviors srressed in the instruction. The total instruction time focusing on metacognition in the experiment was 16.1 hours spread over 12 weeks of instruction, averaging slightly more than ! (35.7%) of the mathematics dassroom time during the instructionaI period.
The instruction induded both "rounne" and "nonroutine" problems. An example of a routine problem designed to give studentS experience in translating verbal statementS into mat!)-ematical expressions was as follows.
Laura and Beth started reading the same book on Monday. Laura read 19 pages a day and Beth read 4 pages a day. Wbatpage wasBeth on whenLaura wasonpage 133?
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The nonroutine problems used in the study induded "process problems" (problems for which there is no standard algorithm for extracting or representing the given information) and problems with either superfluous or insufficient information. The instruction focused on problems amenable to particular strategies (guess-and-check, work backwards, look for patterns) and inc1uded games for whole-group activities. Assessment data and tools employed before, during, and after the instruction inc1uded written testS, clinica1 interviews, ohservations of individual and pair problem-solving sessions, and videotapes of the classroom instruction. Some of the main condusions drawn by Lester et al. were as follows:
. There is a dynamic interaction betWeen the mathematica1 conceptS and processes (induding metacognitive ones) used to solve problems using those conceptS. That is, control processes and awareness of cognitive processes develop concurrendy with an understanding of mathematica1 conceptS.
. In order for studentS' problem-solving performance to improve, they must attempt to solve a variety of types of problems on a regular basis and over a prolonged period of time.
. Metacognition instruction is most effective when it takes place in a domain-specific context. . Problem-solving instruction, metacognition instruction in panicular, is like ly to be most effective when it is provided in a systematica11yorganized manner under the direction of the teacher.
. It is difficult for the teacher to maintain the roles of monitor, fucilitator, and medel in the face of classroom reality, especially when the studentS are having trouble with basic subject matter.
. . Classroom dynamics regarding small-group activities are not as well understood as one would like, and fucile assumptions that "smaIl-group interactions are best" may not be warranted. The issue of "ideal" dass configurations for problemsolving lessons needs more thought and experimentation.
. Assessment practices must reward and encourage the kinds of behaviors we wish studentS to demonstrate (1989, pp. 88-95) .
Briefly, the' findings discussed in this section are that developing self-regulatory skills in complex subject-matter domains is difficult and often involves behavior modification-"unleaming" inappropriate control behaviors developed through prior instruction. Such change can be catalyzed, but it requires a long period of time, with sustained attention to both cognitive and metacognitive' processes. The rask of creating the "right" instructional context, and providing the appropriate kinds of modeling and guidance, is challenging and subtle for Lester et al., 1989, p. 26) the teacher. The tWo stUwes cited (Lester et al., 1989; SchoenfeId, 1989d) point to some effective teacher behaviors and c1ass-room practices that foster the development of self-regulatory skills. However, these represent only a beginning. They document the teaching efforts of established researchers who. have the luxury to reflect on such issues and prepare instruction devoted to them. Making the move from such "existence proofs" (problematie as they are) to standard classrooms will require a substantial amount of conceptualizing and pedagogical engineering.
Beliefs and Affects
Once upon a time there was a sharply delineated distinction betWeen the cognitive and affective domains, as reflected in the tWovolumes ofBloom's (1956) TaxonomyofEdticational Objecrives.ConceptS such as mathematics anxiety, for example, clearly resided in the affective domain and were measured by questionnaires dealing with how the individual feels about mathematics (see, for example, SUinn, Edie, Nicoletti, & Spinelli, 1972). ConceptS such as mathematics achievement and problem solving resided within the cognitive domain and were assessed by testS focusing on subject-matterlmowledge alone. A5 our vi. sion getSclearer, however, the boundaries between those tWO domains become increasinglyblurred.
Given the space constraintS,to review the relevant literature or even .try to give a sense of it would be an impossibility. Fortunately, one can point to McLeod, Chapter 23, this.volume, and to books such as McLeodand Adams's (1989) 4/fect and Mathematical Problem Solving:A New Perspective as authoritative starting pointS for a discussion of affect.Beliefs-to be interpreted as an inwvidual'sunderstandings and feelingsthat shape the waysthatthe individualconceptualizes and engages in mathematicalbehavior-will receive a telegraphie discussion.The discussion will take pIace in three partS:stUdentbeliefs, teacher beliefs, and general societiUbeliefs about doing mathematics. There is a fairly extensive literatUreon the first, a moderate but growing literatUreon the second, and a small literature on the third. Hence, length of discussion does not correlate with the size of the literature base.
